The paper proposes a unified account of the systematic polysemy of French future (FUT) that does not uniquely rely on Aktionsart. It explains the predominant preference for the temporal interpretation of FUT, appealing to the 'future ratification hypothesis'. This is a felicity condition that can be satisfied to different degrees and among competing interpretations the one that satisfies it to the highest degree is preferred. The paper also shows that FUT does not convey uncertainty at utterance time (t u ), and can be used when the attitude holder knows at t u that the embedded proposition is true.
epistemic reading (e.g. Condoravdi, 2002) .
In this article, we adopt the model of a metaphysically open future, that is to say the model of an undetermined future. 5 Metaphysical indeterminacy, however, can go hand in hand with epistemic certainty (pace Condoravdi, 2002) , as will be developed in section 5.
Finally, the idea that future sentences articulate futurity and verification has been defended by Kissine (2008) . In Kissine's account, FUT only provides tense (present/posteriority). As we will show, this view cannot be extended to French. It is nonetheless interesting to see that French and English code differently the two ingredients of time and verificational modality. This article thus paves the way for future cross-linguistic research on French and English (for earlier views, see Tasmowski and Dendale, 1998; Celle, 2004 ).
The article is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the main data, disentangling FUT from epistemic modality and investigating the systematic polysemy of FUT and its breaches in French. In section 3 we present our main hypothesis. We explain the system of preferences observed in section 4. In section 5 we consider epistemic certainty as well as epistemic paradoxes that arise with future sentences. Section 6 concludes the paper.
DISENTANGLING FUTURE FROM EPISTEMIC MODALITY

Epistemic devoir vs. conjectural future
The idea that FUT conveys future verification is solidly established in the literature and it would be an impossible enterprise to do justice to it (a.o. Schrott, 1997; Tasmowski and Dendale, 1998; Dendale, 2001; Morency, 2010; de Saussure and Morency, 2001 and 5 See Thomason (1984) ; Condoravdi (2002) ; Kaufmann (2005) ; Mari (2014) for formal implementations of this model. references therein). The notion of 'future verification', however, has received many distinct interpretations across the various studies, leading to different conceptions. Tasmowski and Dendale (1998) and Dendale (2001) are representative of one way of understanding 'future verification '. Dendale (2001) contrasts future tense and devoir and explains that devoir can be used if the speaker has evidence in the utterance context for the truth of the prejacent (p from now on), while such evidence is not needed in order to use FUT.
FUT can be used, Dendale claims, even in the absence of such evidence.
Consider a scenario in which I wonder what is happening to John, who is unexpectedly tired. One of his colleagues asserts the following.
(4) Il doit avoir été malade, il a l'air tout pâle.
(5) Il aura été malade, voilà tout.
In both cases the speaker must have 'indirect' evidence, that is to say, he cannot have seen John ill. However, the devoir sentence requires that the speaker bases his assertion on certain pieces of evidence (e.g. John is pale), but the future sentence does not. The idea then arises that some evidence will be available in the future and that the conjecture will be verified then. In Tasmowski and Dendale's view, future sentences lack truth conditions at the time of utterance (see Tasmowski and Dendale, 1998: 327) .
De Saussure and Morency (2011: 209) (S&M for now on), pick up on the idea of future verification, but include it in the semantics of the future, a path that we follow here.
Our general assumption follows the classical analysis in which FUT in French represents a future verification of a possible state of affairs in the present (or in the past, as with the future anterior).
There are some cases in which the idea of future verification works particularly well.
The following example is due to these authors. Two friends are speculating about the shape of the universe. FUT cannot be used to express a conjecture ((6)). Devoir can be used in this context ( (7)).
(6) #L'univers sera sphérique. (S&M, 2011: 217, ex. (34) ) (7) Il doit être sphérique.
De Saussure and Morency explain the impossibility of (6) by the fact that neither the speaker nor the hearer can directly verify whether the universe is spherical. (This is in contrast with Schrott's (1997) view that the verification has to take place within the sphere of experience of the speaker. De Saussure and Morency are, arguably, less restrictive, and either the speaker or the hearer are good candidates for verifying the truth of the prejacent.)
Devoir is unproblematic in this context, as it expresses conjecture ((7)). This shows that an inference-based account does not seem to be suitable for French (pace Caudal, 2012) .
Unlike devoir, FUT can be used when the speaker knows that the prejacent is true at the time of utterance. Again, the example is due to de Saussure and Morency (2011) . A shop employee has just rearranged the shoes on the shelves. A customer enters the shop and asks where the Adidas trainers are. The employee replies (8).
(8) Elles seront sur le présentoir là-bas. (S&M, 2011: 219, ex. (37) 6 )
Here FUT does not express a conjecture. Rather, it postpones the time of verification that the shoes are on the shelf with respect to the time of utterance. Here the hearer (pace Schrott, 1997) will be responsible for the verification (see also Azzopardi and Bres, 2014) .
There are other uses of FUT, however, for which theories holding that FUT means future verification must provide a more elaborate account.
FUT, in French, features a truly epistemic (or conjectural use). Consider a scenario in which I have been travelling to Japan and stayed at a hotel. Later, I could not find my watch.
My husband utters (9).
(9) Tu l'auras laissée à l'hôtel.
The question immediately arises of what 'future verification' amounts to. Schrott (1997) proposes that with the future anterior and the conjectural interpretation there is a reinterpretation at the de dicto level of the future verification at de re level that characterizes the temporal interpretation. Translating this view into other terms, we would obtain an ambiguity of the future, emerging as a type-theoretical difference: for the temporal interpretation FUT's denotation falls within the domain of events, and in the conjectural interpretation, in that of propositions. This view is certainly tenable and in fact has been advanced more recently by Copley (2002) . However, before positing an ambiguity -for the sake of economy of the theory -it behoves us to attempt to provide a unified entry and explain the ambiguity in a systematic way without positing a type-theoretical distinction. The one we provide in this paper will also be able to cover cases that are not easy to categorize in either one of the two classes (de re -de dicto cases) and which clearly fall within a system of preferences. To our knowledge, this has only recently been considered in more depth (see de Saussure and Morency, 2011) .
Let us return to (9). In this interpretation, FUT behaves similarly to devoir (must)
( (10)). In the same scenario, the following sentence is acceptable.
(10) Tu dois l'avoir laissée à l'hôtel.
Note also that FUT cannot be a temporal operator that forward-shifts the time of the event (or one that locates the event, at the earliest, at the time of utterance; see Kissine, 2008) .
If FUT were such an operator, a future-in-the-past reading would be obtained for (10) (9)). In some other cases, the speaker knows at the time of utterance that it is true ( (11)).
An adequate theory of the future, we claim, must be able to explain the facts summarized in Table 1 (see below) . Like devoir, FUT seems to be able to convey present conjecture. This conjecture is grounded in indirect evidence ( (9)). Unlike devoir, FUT can use direct evidence ( (11)). Unlike devoir, it can denote future verification ( (8) The diversity of these uses is puzzling. Thus, one of the goals of this paper is to propose a theory that explains these distributions in a principled way. Let us note that we do not claim that these are all and only the available uses of the French FUT (see for instance Azzopardi and Bres, 2014 for discussion of the 'future of assertion' and the 'discovery' use). We also do not consider here the rhetorical values of FUT in French (see Rossari et al., 2014) . To achieve our goal, we examine the evidential component of the ratificational modal, also considering the effects of this component on the system of preferences observed, to which we now turn.
Breaking the cross-linguistic pattern
7
It is now a common observation that the epistemic/non-epistemic ambiguity of modals correlates with the aspectual properties of the complement they combine with (see most notably Sueur, 1979; Condoravdi, 2002; Copley, 2002; Malchukov, 2009; Boogaart and Trnavac, 2011; Caudal, 2012; Giannakidou and Mari, to appear-a) The same pattern is illustrated by FUT in French, most clearly by the future anterior.
Simple future sentences with eventives feature the temporal interpretation ( (15)), whereas future anterior sentences feature the epistemic interpretation ( (16)).
(15) Jean mangera de la pizza ce midi. (temporal) John eat.3SG.FUT of the pizza this noon.
'John will eat pizza at lunch.'
(16) Jean aura mangé de la pizza, il a une moustache rouge. Here the adverb hier (yesterday) locates the event of leaving the watch at the hotel rather than the time of the result.
For all these cases, we endorse the view that the future anterior involves a resultative construction (see also Gosselin, 1996; Vet, 2007) and has to be treated as a stative, most notably following a recent analysis in Boogaart and Trnavac (2011) . Importantly for us, this resultative construction (which we label RES(p)) provides a handle for the evidential component of the ratificational modal as we explain in detail in section 3. He must go at the doctor.
'He must go to the doctor.'
Most of the accounts we are aware of derive the facts by relying on the boundednessunboundedness difference (or, alternatively, the perfective-imperfective distinction, or the eventive-stative distinction). That boundedness correlates with forward-shifting is sometimes considered a primitive of the theory (Condoravdi, 2002) . According to Boogaart and Trvanac in which Mary is on a train, her telephone rings, but she does not answer. A friend of mine, who is waiting for Mary with me at the train station, tries to figure out why she is not answering. I reply (25). Out of the blue, the utterance is not natural.
(25) #Son train traversera un tunnel. (S&M, 2011: 214, ex . (10)).
Her train go-through.3SG.FUT a tunnel.
Morency (2010) An adequate theory of FUT in French, it seems, requires that we find an explanation of the epistemic / temporal ambiguity of FUT in French which does not rely entirely on lexical 10 See Morency (2010: 208) for an in-depth discussion of this example. 11 Here 'connaître un plombier' is not a stative, as the incompatibility with pendant adverbials shows: *Il connaîtra un plombier pendant des années. See discussion in Morency (2010: 208) .
aspect (i.e. Aktionsart), and can provide the following empirical coverage:
(i) the preference for a temporal interpretation with both eventives and statives for simple future sentences;
(ii) the availability of the epistemic reading with statives in simple future sentences;
(iii) the impossibility of the epistemic reading with eventives in the absence of the 'rescuing strategy' of mentioning a future event of ratification;
(iv) the unproblematic compatibility of the epistemic interpretation with the future anterior.
While all the work that we are aware of acknowledges these preferences, we know of no previous attempt to explain them in a principled way. The view we are about to present covers these preferences, and makes sense of the distributions observed in section 2.1, without appealing to semantic ambiguity.
THE HYPOTHESIS
Ratificational modality
Our hypothesis is that FUT in French makes a triple contribution, at different levels: temporal, modal (in the semantics) and evidential (in the pragmatics). That FUT contributes modality and temporality is now a common assumption in the literature on FUT across languages (cf. Recall that, in order to felicitously utter (27), the speaker must not have seen the rain, but must have some indication that it is raining.
(27) It must be raining.
Importantly, when modality interacts with time, this constraint on the context holds at the time when the modal is evaluated. Let us provide an example independent of the French FUT. It is well known that a modal in the imperfect in French can have an epistemic meaning and can be evaluated in the past (see Boogaart and Trnavac, 2011; Mari, 2015 At the time of evaluation of the epistemic modal (which is past), the speaker had evidence (in this case, indirect, inferential evidence) that the keys were in the drawer. Indirect evidence that is available in the past is a constraint on the context, at the time of evaluation of the modal.
Our hypothesis is thus that the future contributes a temporal component which forward- We now turn to the evidential constraint imposed by the modal. We propose the following principle (29) for FUT as a ratificational modal. and the time of evaluation of the prejacent coincide. This is a felicity constraint that the modal imposes on the context of its evaluation. 13 12 Note that the reverse does not hold. If the time of evaluation and of the modal coincide, the modal is not necessarily ratificational and can be conjectural. 13 Our account shares some features with Lee's (2012) analysis of Korean evidential -te. Lee has argued that -te expresses that the speaker has sensory information about the described eventuality and that this sensory information is available at the time of utterance. Interestingly, -te can express direct or indirect sensory information depending on the tense it combines with. When it combines with the past tense, it can only mark
The ratificational modal constraint, FUT, and the effects on temporality
We have argued that FUT forward-shifts the time of evaluation of the ratificational modal.
The ratificational modal is felicitously used if the judge has direct evidence at the time of evaluation of the modal. In our account, the constraint of direct evidence boils down to a temporal constraint that the time of evaluation of the modal and of the prejacent must coincide. Let us now consider how different interpretations of future sentences in French deal with this constraint. We propose to analyze simple future sentences as in (31) (see below).
We have stated that FUT represents future verification, in line with previous proposals.
It is thus a complex operator that introduces temporal and modal information, and forwardshifts the time of evaluation of the modal. On the other hand, the time of evaluation of the prejacent (we assume that propositions are evaluated not only with respect to worlds, but also to times) can be either the present (in the conjectural interpretation) or the future (in the temporal interpretation). The temporal argument of the prejacent is thus not saturated by FUT.
For simple future sentences, in line with Abusch (2004) and Giannakidou and Mari (2013, to appear-a), we reconstruct an element NON-PAST, which locates the prejacent either at utterance time, or at a time that follows the time of utterance.
14 This leads to the intended interpretation, in a compositional framework, according to which FUT contributes future verification of a proposition whose time of evaluation is either the utterance time or a future time.
indirect evidence. Lee thus proposes that direct information requires that the time at which the evidence is available and the time of the eventuality coincide. When the time at which the evidence is available and the time at which the eventuality takes place do not coincide, -te can only mark indirect information. -te always has present perspective, that is to say, differently from FUT, its time of evaluation is the time of utterance. Lee notes that -te can also be combined with the future tense and thus receives a conjectural interpretation. The point of similarity between ours and Lee's account is the notion that having direct evidence means that the time of the evaluation of the modal (in the case of FUT)/evidential (in the case of -te) coincides with the time of evaluation of the prejacent.
14 See also Abusch (2004) ; Giannakidou and Mari (to appear-a); formally, NON-PAST provides an interval that starts at the time of utterance and goes on to infinitum as well as quantification over a time in this interval.
(31) FUT(NON-PAST(p))
There is a time in the future of the utterance time at which a judge verifies whether p. p can be evaluated at t u or at a t', t' ≻ t u . (t' ≻ t u means that t' occurs later than t u ).
The As we have argued, the ratificational modal constraint requires that, if possible, the prejacent should be evaluated at the time of evaluation of the ratificational modal, which is in the future with respect to the time of utterance. This straightforwardly allows us to predict that, for simple future sentences, the temporal interpretation is the preferred one (we will return in section 4 to the system of preferences).
As depicted in Figure 1 , in order to satisfy (29), the time of evaluation of p is fixed as being in the future with respect to utterance time and as coinciding with the time of evaluation of the modality. We use VER for 'verification'. We place a question mark next to p to indicate that it is not metaphysically determined whether p will be true in the actual world (and thus will be known to be true). Recall that we
consider cases in which the event is located before the time of utterance).
As for (9) (repeated here as (34.b)), the perfect provides a proposition that describes the resulting state of the event described in the prejacent proposition p. At a future time, a judge (the addressee, here) can only witness the result of the event described in p rather than the event in p itself. Verification will thus proceed via indirect evidence (see Figure 2 , below).
Note that even in this case, we are arguing that FUT represents future ratification. As the time of evaluation of the prejacent and of the verificational modal cannot coincide, there is weakening and the ratification will proceed via indirect evidence (see (30)). Importantly though, future verification is still represented in the semantics. Tu auras laissé ta montre à l'hôtel.
We obtain the following (see Figure 2 ). Up to now, we have proposed that FUT represents future verification in all cases (including the epistemic case with the future anterior). At this point a number of issues still require an explanation. First, we must explain the system of preferences observed (see section 2.2). Second, we must show how we deal with the so-called epistemic interpretation of simple future sentences and more generally clarify the nature of the 'conjecture' in the epistemic interpretation (see section 5).
'MAXIMIZE FELICITY' AND THE PREFERENCE FOR THE TEMPORAL INTERPRETATION OF SIMPLE FUTURE SENTENCES
The discussion in section 2.2 highlighted a system of preferences. Our conclusions were the following. The temporal interpretation is the default for simple future sentences regardless of whether the predicate under the modal is eventive or stative. The epistemic interpretation is unproblematic for future anterior sentences. We consider here only simple future sentences, focusing on their 'epistemic' interpretation.
The epistemic interpretation is widely associated with statives. Let us repeat the relevant examples. The epistemic interpretation of simple future sentences with eventives is rarely in evidence, but cannot be ruled out entirely. The relevant cases are repeated here for clarity.
(37) A: J'ai une fuite dans la salle de bain ! (S&M, 2011: 219, ex. (19) ) B: Demande à Pierre, il connaîtra un plombier !
We now show that this system of preferences can be explained by considering the status of the ratificational modal constraint and how aspectual distinctions deal with it, thereby
proposing an alternative to accounts that rely only on aspectual distinctions and points of view.
Let us recall that, with simple future sentences, the time of evaluation of the prejacent is either t u or t' ≻ t u . The temporal interpretation is obtained when the prejacent is evaluated at t' and the conjectural interpretation arises when it is interpreted at t u . We have explained, that, in virtue of (29), by default, the prejacent in simple future sentences is evaluated at a future time.
We must now explain the competition with the epistemic interpretations, as this is also available, although dispreferred.
We have claimed that the ratificational modal constraint can be weakened, and, indeed, we have allowed for such weakening: see (30). In other words, this amounts to stating that the ratificational modal constraint can be satisfied to different degrees, depending on whether the time of evaluation of the prejacent coincides or not with the time of evaluation of the modal.
Specifically, it is satisfied to the highest degree if the time of evaluation of the modal and of the prejacent coincide. It is satisfied to a lesser degree if this is not the case. The higher the degree to which the felicity constraint (i.e. the ratificational modal constraint) is satisfied, the stronger the interpretation of the sentence. The idea of strength correlates with the ranking of direct and indirect evidence as evidence for acquiring knowledge. Direct evidence ranks higher than indirect evidence.
Following Dalrymple et al. (1998) , we propose that when multiple interpretations for a given form are in competition, the strongest one is preferred (this is known as the strongest meaning hypothesis -SMH). In our setting, the strongest interpretation is the one that best satisfies the ratificational modal constraint. Recall that the ratificational modal constraint is a condition imposed on the context of evaluation of the modal introduced by FUT and it is thus a felicity condition. We propose the following principle for maximization of the felicity condition associated with FUT.
(38) Maximize felicity. If multiple interpretations are in competition in a given context, choose the one that best satisfies the felicity conditions of FUT.
For simple future sentences, as observed, two interpretations are in competition: the temporal and the epistemic interpretation.
Let us consider eventives first. In the temporal interpretation, the ratificational modal constraint is satisfied to the highest degree, as the time of evaluation of the modal and of p coincide. If the time of evaluation of the modal and of p do not coincide, and p is evaluated at the time of utterance, only indirect verification is allowed. On the temporal interpretation, the ratificational modal constraint is satisfied to the highest degree with eventives, and it is thus the strongest. According to the SMH, it is the preferred one as well, in virtue of (38). This explains why the temporal interpretation is the default one for simple future sentences.
Let us consider statives. On the conjectural interpretation, the time of evaluation of the prejacent is t u . FUT nonetheless represents future verification. With many authors (see e.g. the extended discussion of Aktionsart in modal contexts in Condoravdi, 2002; de Saussure and Morency, 2011; Mari, 2014) , we assume that statives are associated with an inference of persistence. Unless otherwise stated, a stative eventuality holds for an unbounded period of time. With statives, the ratificational modal constraint can also be satisfied when the time of evaluation of the prejacent is also t u . The epistemic interpretation of FUT is thus better accepted with statives than with eventives. It is nonetheless dispreferred compared to the temporal interpretation. This is probably due to the complexity of the interpretation that appeals to the inference of persistence with statives.
Using a system of preferences, we are now able to explain why the temporal interpretation of FUT is predominantly preferred, but also why the epistemic interpretation is not ruled out. It is available but it is dispreferred.
With the future anterior, verification can only be indirect. Since this is the only possibility allowed (and thus is not in competition with any other interpretation), the epistemic interpretation is unproblematic.
Note that, for the time being, we have simply stated that under the epistemic interpretation, p is evaluated at the time of utterance. We need to say more about the status of the 'epistemic interpretation' and consider it more closely in relation to future verification.
EPISTEMIC SETTLEDNESS AND THE CONJECTURAL EFFECT
There is no inference of uncertainty
There is a general consensus for proposing that, if FUT conveys future verification, then at the time of utterance, the speaker is in a state of uncertainty (either about the future (in the temporal reading) or the present (in the epistemic reading).
subject. The key ingredient in our account is the ratificational modal constraint that is attached to ratificational modality, requiring that the time of evaluation of the modal and of the prejacent coincide, whenever possible. We have also allowed for weakening of this constraint and proposed that it can be satisfied to different degrees, depending on whether or not the time of evaluation of the modal and of the prejacent coincide. In the first case evidence for assessing the truth of p is direct, but in the second, it is indirect.
We have proposed a unified account of the temporal and epistemic uses, in which the time of evaluation of the prejacent is unspecified and is fixed via the ratificational modal constraint. When more than one interpretation is available (i.e. the time of evaluation of the prejacent can be either the utterance time or the future of the utterance time), the ratificational modal constraint disambiguates according to the strongest meaning hypothesis: the interpretation that best satisfies the constraint is the strongest. The constraint is best satisfied when evidence is direct rather than indirect.
Besides deriving in a principled way the temporal and the epistemic interpretation without positing ambiguity, we also propose a new understanding of the systematic ambiguity of the future. Positing ambiguity would not do justice to the systematicity with which future expressions code temporal and epistemic information so robustly across languages. Our view, adopting a flexible principle for deriving the available interpretations, has also afforded an explanation of the system of preferences, a breach in the cross-linguistic pattern according to which statives correlate with the epistemic interpretation of modals and eventives with nonepistemic interpretations. French FUT is puzzling in this respect, as the temporal (nonepistemic) interpretation is overwhelmingly preferred with both statives and eventives.
We have also proposed that the semantics of FUT always codes future verification (direct or indirect) and that the epistemic 'interpretation' is indeed an epistemic effect that arises when the speaker has indirect evidence and the truth/falsity of p or RES(p) is already settled at the time of utterance. We have shown that the epistemic effect is an inference that can be cancelled, as in (8) with the simple future, and as in the 'present ratification' use which we saw in (11)-(12) with the future anterior. In this use, we have argued, FUT represents future ratification, and, since the conjectural component is an inference that can be cancelled when the speaker has direct evidence at the time of utterance, we can propose a unified theory of FUT in which (11)- (12) are to be understood in a way parallel to (8). Such a solution could not be adopted by positing a conjectural modal in the semantics of FUT.
Finally, we have disentangled the epistemic effect (arising when the speaker has indirect evidence at t u ) from uncertainty at t u . We have argued that FUT does not correlate with 
